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We  analyze  the  evolution  and  extent  of  income  tax  evasion  under  alternative 
governmental  policies  in  an  agent-based  model  with  heterogeneous  agents.  A  novel 
aspect of our modeling is the use of an exponential utility function, which allows us to 
assume rather realistic audit probabilities and to yield more realistic results with respect 
to the extent of tax evasion. Further, the introduction of lapse of time effects constitutes 
another novel aspect of our model. Among other things, the model allows for assessing 
the impact of alternative policies on tax evasion. Subject to the model features, we find 
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1  Introduction 
In this paper we develop an agent-based income tax evasion model that allows for simulating large 
populations of heterogeneous agents. Heterogeneity refers not only to individually different income 
levels and risk preferences, but also to four behaviorally different agent types of which one type is in 
line with Allingham and Sandmo (1972). Among other things, a novel aspect of our model consists of 
using an exponential utility function for specifying the expected utility of the Allingham and Sandmo 
type. Our results show that this specification yields far more realistic behavior patterns for such tax 
payers than specifications based on Cobb-Douglas utility functions. Moreover, the specification allows 
us to incorporate lapse of time effects on tax evasion, which constitutes another novel aspect of our 
model.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section we briefly discuss agent-
based tax evasion models. In section three we introduce our model. Simulation scenarios and results 
are presented in section four. The last section concludes. 
 
2  Background 
Agent-based models are gaining some popularity in economics since the 1990s (Tesfatsion and Judd 
2006).  However,  the  first  agent-based  tax  evasion  models  did  not  appear  before  the  2000s.  This 
notwithstanding, we already observe two rather distinct developments in the literature.  
First, there are a number of agent-based tax evasion models designed by economists, for example, 
Mittone and Patelli (2000), Davis et al. (2003), Korobow et al. (2007) and Bloomquist (2004, 2009), 
of which some are summarized and compared by Bloomquist (2006). In addition, a second branch has 
emerged  from  a  new  research  area  of  physics,  which  is  called  econophysics  or  sociophysics. 
Overviews are provided by Schulz (2003) and Kulakowski and Nawojczyk (2008). Tax evasion papers 
falling into this latter domain have generated some interesting results. For example, Zaklan et al. 
(2008: 5858) find that even very small levels of enforcement are sufficient to establish almost full tax 
compliance and Zaklan et al. (2009: 12) conclude that regardless of how strong group influence may 
be, enforcement always works to enhance tax compliance.  3 
 
In general, agent-based tax evasion models that fall into the econophysics domain, for example, 
papers by Zaklan et al. (2009, 2008), Lima (2009), Lima and Zaklan (2008), all rest on a model of 
ferromagnetism. The latter was originally developed by the German physicist Ernst Ising in 1925 and 
Brush (1967) extended and generalized the Ising model, which is today a standard model in statistical 
mechanics. In agent-based tax evasion models of the econophysics type the Ising model is used to 
mimic conditional cooperation among agents (Zaklan et al. 2009). Yet, the actual patterns and levels 
of tax evasion in these models depend on two additional factors: the network structure of society and 
the tax enforcement mechanism. The network structure is implemented by alternative lattice types and 
tax enforcement consists of the two economic standard parameters audit probability and penalty rate. 
Since the latter two factors are common for every agent-based tax evasion model (Bloomquist 
2006), it follows that the role of the Ising model is the essential factor that makes agent-based tax 
evasion  models  of  econophysics  type  different  from  those  designed  by  economists.  It  must  be 
emphasized, however, that the role of the Ising model goes much beyond that of providing a basis for 
conditional cooperation. In fact, the Ising model, or more precisely, the role of temperature in the Ising 
model,  is  a  driving  force  for  the  results  obtained  from  these  models.  The  value  of  temperature 
essentially determines to which degree agents take decisions more or less autonomously. For very low 
temperatures agents hardly decide autonomously, but copy the behavior of others in their relevant 
social network or group. Furthermore, there exists a critical temperature that is important for regime 
switches, i.e., switches in the order of the whole system. To put this differently, the exogenously 
determined  variable  ‘temperature’  influences  all  agents  of  society  simultaneously.  Does  such  a 
variable really exist in real human societies and, if so, can we give an economic interpretation of this 
process?  Apparently,  up  to  now  there  is  no  convincing  explanation  or  re-interpretation  of 
‘temperature’ in economic and social systems (Schulz 2003).  
Therefore, in this paper we refrain from using the Ising model. Rather, we develop an agent-based 




3  The Model 
In this section we begin with a brief overview regarding some general aspects of the model design. 
The following subsection deals with a detailed description of  the behavioral types and their decision 
rules. On the technical side the model is set up in MATLAB (version 7.8.0. R2009a) and codes are 
available upon request. 
 
3.1  Model Design 
In both agent-based tax evasion models designed by economists (Bloomquist 2006) and in theoretical 
approaches to tax evasion (Prinz 2010) it becomes more and more popular to consider behaviorally 
different types of agents to capture more realistic images of real societies. We follow this route and 
consider four behavioral types. In particular, ‘maximizing a-type agents’ who show an expected utility 
maximizing behavior in line with the Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model, ‘imitating b-type agents’ 
who copy successful tax evasion behavior, if they observe it within their social network, ‘ethical c-
type agents’ who always declare their true income due to certain behavioral norms such as Kantian 
behavior, patriotism and the like, and finally ‘random d-type agents’ who wish to declare their true 
income but may make mistakes within a neighborhood around their true income, for example, because 
of the complexities of tax law. We assume that agent type shares are a priori given and in principle 
constant over all periods, but the initial distribution of these type shares can be freely selected as a 
parameter of the model. 
The number of agents N and the number of tax relevant periods T are also parameters of the model.  
According to Bloomquist (2006) and Zaklan et al. (2009), agent-based tax evasion models designed by 
economists  usually  deal  with  a  range  of  just  1,000  agents,  whereas  models  falling  into  the 
econophysics domain use about 1,000,000 or more agents. Our model runs with 150,000 agents and 
we consider 40 tax relevant periods (tax years), because such a time span may well represent the 
average for which agents may have to pay taxes in the real world. The lattice structure which we 
assume is of a simple ring world type (see Epstein and Axtell 1996). Essentially, this means that the 
agent population is represented by a row vector of 150,000 agents, where each agent has a certain 
visibility into one direction. For example, each agent may observe the behavior of one (four, eight, …) 5 
 
of his/her neighbor(s) to the left. The row vector can be interpreted as a ring world, if the first agent on 
the left hand side of the row vector can observe the behavior of the last agent on the right hand side of 
the row vector.  Each agent is endowed with an individual taxable income W, which may differ among 
agents, and has to declare in every tax relevant period an income X to the tax authorities, which is the 
decision variable. Agents are faced with three tax evasion relevant parameters, which are well known 
from Allingham and Sandmo (1972), in particular, the tax rate on declared income θ, the tax rate on 
undeclared income π and the objective audit probability p. In addition, we introduce a new parameter, 
which is the tax law complexity parameter γ, where higher values indicate a more complex tax law. 
All four parameters are directly or indirectly set by the government via the tax authorities. Therefore, 
to simulate tax policy changes, these four parameters may change only after an election year, say 
every fourth year, but are constant in all other periods (see Table 1).  
 
3.2  Behavioral Types 
Maximizing  a-type  agents:  Following  Allingham  and  Sandmo  (1972)  again,  we  assume  that 
maximizing a-types are risk-adverse and, therefore, have a concave utility function. In particular, we 
specify the utility function U of the i-th a-type as an exponential function (Kirkwood 2004), which 
implies a constant absolute risk aversion (CARA), 
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with  i  =  1,  …,  N.  In  (1)  ATPIi  denotes  the  after  tax  and  penalty  net  income  and  li  denotes  an 
individual, randomly allotted risk parameter, which is uniformly distributed on the interval [0; 1], 
where l = 0 indicates a preference for risk-neutrality and l = 1 indicates a high preference for risk-
aversion. Thus, a-type agents are heterogeneous with respect to their risk preferences. As noted, agents 
declare in every tax relevant period an income Xi to the tax authorities. If they are not detected they 
retain an after tax and penalty net income according to (2),  
 
ATPIi = Wi - θXi,                        (2) 6 
 
 
However, if they are subject to an audit, the tax authorities learn their true income Wi and, therefore, 
their extent of tax evasion. In this case the after tax and penalty net income is determined according to 
(3),  
 
ATPIi = Wi - θXi - π(Wi-Xi).                     (3) 
 
To  simplify  notation,  in  the  following  we  refrain  from  using  the  index  i,  unless  where  strictly 
necessary. By definition we have θ < π and, thus, the excess of π over θ essentially represents a 
penalty for tax evasion. Moreover, we distinguish between an objective audit probability p, which is 
determined  by  the  government  and  a  subjective  audit  probability  ps,  which  is  relevant  for  the 
individual decision of the agent. Typically we assume p = ps, but if an audit has taken place and a 
penalty  was  due,  we  assume  instead  that  maximizing  a-type  agents  disregard  the  objective  audit 
probability p in some following periods. In particular, they raise their subjective audit probability to ps 
= 1 in the first period after the audit and then gradually decrease their subjective audit probability in 
each of the following periods by using their updating parameter δ = -0.20 until the objective audit 
probability p is reached again, with p = ps.  
Thus, in line with Allingham and Sandmo (1972), a-type agents maximize their expected utility 
according to (4), 
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 By taking the first order derivative with respect to X and by taking the two constrains mentioned by 
Allingham and Sandmo (1972, eq. 5 and 6) into account, we obtain the necessary and sufficient 
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According to (5) a-types declare their full income, X = W, if π·ps > θ holds, they declare no income at 
all, X = 0, if ps falls below the lower limit of the interval and they declare part of their income if ps 
falls into the interval, that is, they declare X  according to (6). However, the upper limit of the interval 
is generally determined by θ and π and holds for every a-type agent alike, whereas the lower limit of 
the interval depends also on W and l, which we have both individualized. Therefore, the length of the 
interval in (5) may differ for every a-type agent. For example, assume that we have θ = 0.2, π = 0.3 
and that there are two agents i = 1, 2, with l1 = 0.05, W1 = 10 and l2 = 0.5, W2 = 50. Agent 1 has a low 
preference for risk-aversion and a low income and his interval according to (5) is: 0.63 < ps < 0.67, 
whereas agent 2 has both a higher preference for risk-aversion and a higher income, so that his interval 
amounts to: 0.0011 < ps < 0.67. Hence, agent 2 will declare part of his income even for very low audit 
probabilities of less than one percent. In fact, such rather long intervals result from our specification of 
the utility function and help to make the model more realistic.  
Imitating b-type agents: They have a visibility parameter ν, which indicates the size of their social 
network, that is, the number of agents they observe. We assume a social network size of n = 4, as in 
Zaklan et al. (2009: 4). Agents confine in all agents that belong to their social network and, therefore, 
the extent of tax evasion is known within each social network. Thus, in period t imitating b-type 
agents declare the mean of the voluntarily declared income, Xi,t, observed within their social network 
during the previous tax period t-1, with t = 2, …, T, which is calculated by, 
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Note, however, that b-types declare Xi,t according to (7) only if tax evasion was on average successful 
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 If condition (8) does not hold, imitating b-type agents use their default option and declare their true 
income or, in other words, mutate to a c-type. Further, if b-type agents are audited and a penalty is 
due, they also mutate to a c-type and declare their true income for a limited number of tax periods t 
and in each simulation we have set t  = 4. Thereafter, they return to their imitating behavior and may 
again evade taxes. Hence, if a-type or b-type agents have been found guilty of tax evasion both types 
may refrain from tax evasion for some periods. For a-types this period is endogenously determined by 
(5) and d. In contrast, it is exogenously determined for b-types byt, as in Zaklan et al. (2008). Also, 
the behavior pattern as such may be explained by psychological reasons (see Kirchler 2007 for an 
overview) or by ethical concerns. 
  Ethical  c-type  agents:  They  are  motivated  by  some  ethical  behavioral  norms  and,  therefore, 
declare their true income X = W irrespectively of the consequences and never change this decision in 
any period of the model. 
  Random d-type agents: In principle, like c-type agents, d-type agents wish to declare their true 
income, but are faced with a complexity parameter γ, which indicates the complexities of the tax law. 
Given  these  complexities,  random  d-type  agents  may  make  unintended  mistakes  with  respect  to 
declaring their true income and, therefore, the decision variable X is assumed to be normal distributed 
with expectation    = W  and standard deviation s  = γ · W. Hence, random d-types may declare less 
than their true income or more, but on average they declare their true income correctly. Note, however, 
that imitating b-types may copy d-type behavior, in particular, if the d-types accidently evade taxes.  
 9 
 
4  Simulation scenarios 
In the following we describe the simulation scenarios which we run and present some results. In each 
simulation, we consider a fixed b-type share of 35 percent and a fixed d-type share of 15 percent. The 
d-type share is to some extent in line with Andreoni et al. (1998), who claim that about seven percent 
of  U.S.  households  overpaid  their  taxes  in  1988.  For  simplicity,  we  assume  that  about  the  same 
percentage  share  has  accidently  underpaid  their  taxes,  which  gives  the  d-type  share  of  about  15 
percent. Furthermore, the a-type share is raised in steps of ten percentage points from zero to 50 
percent at the expense of the c-type share and vice versa. This gives six different type distributions 
ranging from zero percent a-types and 50 percent c-types to 50 percent a-types and zero percent c-
types, each with fixed shares of b-types (35 percent) and d-types (15 percent). We run each of these 
six type distributions a 100 times and with the same parameter set, because this procedure allows us to 
assess the impact of ethical behavior on tax evasion under ceteris paribus conditions. 
 
 
4.1  First Scenario 
 
In each run of this scenario taxable income W is uniformly distributed on the integer interval [0; 100], 
randomly allotted in the first period and then held constant with respect to all future periods. To 
simulate changes in tax policies of the government under ceteris paribus conditions we allow for just 
one parameter change every fourth period. The relevant parameter set is given in Table 1, where 
changes are denoted in bold. 
 
Table 1: Governmental Tax Policy Changes 
 
Period    1  5  9  13  17  21  25  29  33  37  40 
                         
Audit prob.  p  0.01  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.04  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.05 
Tax rate  θ  0.20  0.20  0.20  0.30  0.30  0.40  0.40  0.40  0.40  0.30  0.30 
Penalty rate  π  0.30  0.30  0.45  0.45  0.45  0.45  0.45  0.45  0.50  0.50  0.50 
Complexity   γ  0.10  0.10  0.10  0.10  0.20  0.20  0.20  0.20  0.20  0.20  0.20 
 
Note: Period denotes the period in which a change takes place, which is every fourth period and after 





The parameter set shown in Table 1 may be interpreted as reflecting either different governments or 
policy changes of the ruling government. The set is characterized by comparatively low values for all 
four  parameters  during  the  first  four  tax  periods.  In  the  following  eight  periods  (5  to  12)  the 
government tries to fight tax evasion by raising the audit probability and the tax rate on undeclared 
income. However, in periods 13 to 24 the government not only raises tax rates on declared income, but 
also the complexity of the tax system. During the following twelve periods (25 to 36) the government 
again tries to actively fight tax evasion by raising the audit probability and the tax rate on undeclared 
income. Finally, during the last four tax periods (37 to 40) the government eventually fights income 
tax evasion by lowering the tax rate on declared income.  
Moreover, in periods ten and 27, we audit an additional ten percent of a-type and b-type agents to 
simulate  an  exogenous  shock.  For  example,  that  the  tax  authorities  receive  a  CD-ROM  with 
incriminating,  personalized  bank  information,  which  is  tax  evasion  relevant.  Essentially,  such  a 
scenario resembles the 2008 Liechtenstein or the 2010 Swiss CD tax affairs in Germany. Figure 1 
shows the voluntary mean tax rate, θ S Xi /S Wi, based on 100 runs, each with 150,000 agents, over 40 
tax periods (years) for six different type distributions. 
In Figure 1, the first line from above represents the voluntary mean tax rate for type distribution: 
a= 0%, b=35%, c=50%, d=15%. This line may be used as a benchmark because there is almost no tax 
evasion since all types declare their full income either directly or on average, so that the voluntary 
mean tax rate coincides with the official tax rate on declared income, θ. However, in period 17 the 
change of tax complexity parameter γ (see Table 1) leads to a very slight knick, due to unintended tax 
evasion of random d-type agents and some b-type imitation of this behavior. In contrast, the five 
remaining lines all represent some extent of tax evasion, which is measured as the vertical difference 
between these lines and the benchmark. Thus, the last line from above, representing type distribution: 
a=50%, b=35%, c=0%, d=15%, shows the highest extent of tax evasion.  
This result clearly indicates that ethically motivated behavior is an effective tool for fighting tax 
evasion. Ethical education and related means that foster tax law compliance should, therefore, play a 
more prominent role in the debate on fighting tax evasion. 
 11 
 
Figure 1: Voluntary Mean Tax Rate of Scenario 1 
 
Note: Seen from above the six lines denote the mean tax rate due to voluntary tax declarations (θ S Xi 
/S Wi), subject to the relevant type distribution and the prevailing parameter set. Parameter values 
controlled by the government are provided in Table 1. All remaining parameter values are fixed for 
the 40 tax periods and assume the following values: a-type subjective audit probability updating δ = -
0.20, b-type visibility n = 4, b-type mutation period t = 4.  
 
Moreover, inspection  of  Figure  1  also  allows  for assessing  the  effectiveness of  governmental  tax 
policies described in Table 1, subject to the underlying model features. For simplicity, however, in the 
following we just consider the last line from above, where tax evasion is highest. To begin with, 
consider  period  one.  Here  tax  evasion  amounts  to  about  ((20-13.5)/20=)  32.5  percent,  which  is 
calculated  from  ((θ 100-VMTR 100))/  θ 100=),  where  VMTR  denotes  voluntary  mean  tax  rate  as 
displayed in Figure 1. The extent of tax evasion can be explained on the one hand because a-types, 
who represent 50 percent of the population, declare either part of their income or nothing at all, as 
demonstrated in section 3.2, and, on the other hand, because b-types use their default option and 
declare their full income whereas d-types declare their full income on average. 
In period two, the extent of tax evasion is driven by two effects that have an opposite influence. 
First, b-types begin to imitate successful tax evasion behavior shown by a-types in period one, which 12 
 
leads to more tax evasion. Second, those a-types who were audited in the first period and paid a 
penalty now update their subjective audit probability to ps = 1. Therefore, they declare their true 
income in period two. Inspection of Figure 1 indicates that the first effect dominates from period two 
to four, leading to more tax evasion.  
From period four to twelve the voluntary mean tax rate increases from almost ten percent to about 
15.5 percent. This development is due to various reasons. First, as of round two audited b-types, who 
paid a penalty, declare their true income for the next four periods due to t = 4, so that the share of b-
type agents who declare their true income accumulates over four periods.  Second, essentially the same 
is true for audited a-type agents, who paid a penalty. However, their period for declaring their full 
income is endogenously determined. In periods two to four, a-types declare their full income if ps > 
0.67, according to (5). Hence, if they update their subjective audit probability to ps =1 in the first 
period after the audit and then decrease it each following period by d = -0.20 until p = ps is reached 
again, they declare their full income for two after audit periods because of 1 > 0.67 and 0.8 > 0.67. 
Besides  they  declare  part  of  their  income  or  no  income  at  all  as  of  the  third  after  audit  period, 
depending on their individual interval length according to (5). Third, the increase of the objective audit 
probability p in period five leads ceteris paribus to a higher number of audited a-types and b-types, 
and, therefore, to more agents who update their subjective audit probability and pay their full taxes. 
Fourth, the increase of the tax rate on undeclared income p (penalty rate) leads ceteris paribus to a 
different interval according to (5) and, therefore, may change the number of periods for which a-types 
declare their income partly or fully. For example, with respect to periods nine to twelve the upper limit 
of the interval amounts to 0.44 and, therefore, a-types would declare their full income for three after 
audit periods, rather than for two as in previous periods. Fifth, the number of periods for which a-types 
declare their income fully or partly is also important for the type interaction between a-types and b-
types, because a lower (higher) extent of a-type tax evasion leads to less (more) b-type tax evasion.  
During periods 13 to 24 we do not observe any continuous increase in the mean voluntary tax rate 
and this is because both the objective audit probability and the tax rate on undeclared income remain 
constant. Rather, because the government increases the tax rate on declared income θ, ceteris paribus 
tax evasion increases again. For example, in period four the extent of tax evasion amounts to ((20-13 
 
10)/20=) 50 percent, then falls to ((20-15.5)/20=) 22.5 percent in period twelve, but increases to ((30-
21)/30=) 30 percent in period 16 and to ((40-25)/40=) 37.5 percent in period 24. Among other things, 
the increase in tax evasion is due to a reduction of the number of after audit periods during which a-
types declare their income and because of an amplification of this process by imitating b-types.  
During periods 25 to 36 the government fights income tax evasion again by raising the objective 
audit probability and the tax rate on undeclared income, which yields a rising voluntary mean tax rate 
and reduces tax evasion to ((40-25.5)/40=) 36.25 percent in period 27, to ((40-27)/40=) 32.5 percent in 
period 32, and to ((40-29)/40=) 27.5 percent in period 36.  
Finally,  during  periods  37  to  40  the  government  pursues  a  different  tax  policy  and  fights  tax 
evasion by reducing the tax rate on declared income, while maintaining comparatively high audit and 
penalty rates, which ceteris paribus yields ((30-23)/30=) 23.33 percent tax evasion in period 40. Also, 
the two exogenous shocks in periods ten and 27 contribute to the reduction of tax evasion. In fact, tax 
evasion is reduced by 4.5 percentage points from period ten to eleven and by four percentage points 
from period 27 to 28. Also, given the parameter set, audited and punished a-type agents will declare 
their full income in two periods after the first shock, but in only one period after the second shock.   
  
4.2   Second scenario 
Regarding the second scenario, we use exactly the same parameter values as in the preceding scenario. 
However, we now incorporate a lapse of time parameter, with α = 10, as in the present German tax 
law. Hence, if an audit takes place the present period and up to ten preceding periods are subject to the 
audit and, therefore, maximizing a-type agents now need to consider several periods in their utility 
function. Thus, we need to modify the expected utility function (4) as suggested by Allingham and 
Sandmo (1972: eq. 23) and get,  
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where t denotes the period in which the audit takes place and k denotes the period which is controlled 
due to the lapse of time parameter. The necessary and sufficient condition for an inner solution in the 
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A comparison of (10) with (5) shows that the upper limit of the interval is now also individualized and 
comparing (11) with (6) reveals that the middle term is added. Hence, the introduction of lapse of time 
effects  leads  to  substantial  changes  with  respect  to  the  determinants  of  tax  evasion  behavior  of 
maximizing a-types.  
Figure 2 illustrates the impact of these behavioral changes with respect to the voluntary mean tax 
rate, but for matters of simplicity and readability we display the voluntary mean tax rate for only two 
type distributions. As in Figure 1, the first line from above represents the benchmark with zero percent 
a-types and 50 percent c-types and the last line from above represents the 50 percent a-types and zero 
percent c-types distribution. Thus, Figures 1 and 2 are comparable. 
Comparison of Figures 1 and 2, last line from above, shows that the lapse of time effect leads to a 
substantial reduction of tax evasion over the entire time span, except in the first period where the 
extent of tax evasion is the same. The reason is that according to (9) the lapse of time effect induces 
maximizing a-types to take the extent of their own tax evasion in up to ten past periods into account. 
Therefore, as of period two, a-types may declare part of their income and after some additional periods 15 
 
they may even declare their true income, subject to the relevant parameter set shown in Table 1 and 
their individual income and risk parameters. Moreover, as the extent of a-type tax evasion is gradually 
reduced over time, this behavior pattern is copied by the b-types, which further reduces the extent of 
tax evasion. 
 
Figure 2: Voluntary Mean Tax Rate of Scenario 2 
 
Note: Seen from above the two lines denote the mean tax rate due to voluntary tax declarations (θ S Xi 
/S Wi), subject to the relevant type distribution and the prevailing parameter set. Parameter values 
controlled by the government are provided in Table 1. All remaining parameter values are fixed for 
the 40 tax periods and assume the following values: a-type subjective audit probability updating δ = -
0.20, b-type visibility n = 4, b-type mutation period t = 4. 
 
 
In fact, it follows from Figure 2 that the extent of tax evasion is reduced from 32.5 percent in period 
one to just ((20-19.5)/20=) 2.5 percent in period eleven. Thereafter, the decline of the voluntary mean 
tax rate (i.e., the increase in tax evasion) in period twelve is due to the fact that for a-types the initial 
period has dropped from the set of the relevant ten past periods. As for most a-types the initial period 
was characterized by tax evasion behavior, period twelve allows some a-types to evade taxes again. 
Like in the first scenario, the increase of θ in periods 13 and 21 leads ceteris paribus to more tax 
evasion, but with (30-27.5)/30=) 8.33 percent in period 16 and (40-35)/40=) 12.5 percent in period 24, 16 
 
the extent of tax evasion is much lower than in scenario one. Yet, in both scenarios the extent of tax 
evasion is ceteris paribus the highest where the spread between θ and p is the lowest. Finally, by 
increasing this spread again, the government can eventually reduce the extent of tax evasion to just 
(30-28.75)/30=) 4.2 percent in period 40. Figure 3 illustrates the extent of tax evasion for the case of 
50 percent a-types and no c-types of scenario 1 and 2 and, therefore, corresponds to the last line from 
above in Figures 1 and 2.  
 
Figure 3: Extent of Tax Evasion in Scenario 1 and 2 
 
 
Note: The first line from above denotes the extent of tax evasion in percent with respect to the case of 
scenario 1 (α = 0), 50 percent a-types and no c-types (last line from above in Figure 1.  Likewise, the 
second line from above denotes the extent of tax evasion in percent with respect to the case of scenario 
2 (α = 10), 50 percent a-types and no c-types (last line from above in Figure 2).  
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5  Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we have simulated income tax evasion in a society of heterogeneous agents, where 
heterogeneity refers to different behavioral types, different individual risk-preferences and different 
taxable incomes. Within this society some agents maximize their expected utility via an exponential 
utility function. This modeling feature has important advantages. First, we can make rather realistic 
assumptions about the audit probabilities (Bloomquist 2006: 414).  Second, we can incorporate lapse 
of time effects. To our best knowledge, this has not been done in any agent-based tax evasion model. 
The simulation results presented in the preceding section by and large confirm the findings of 
previous theoretical, experimental and agent-based studies (e.g. Allingham and Sandmo 1972, Alm et 
al.  1992,  Bloomquist  2006,  Zaklan  et  al.  2009,  2008).  In  particular,  raising  (lowering)  the  audit 
probability or the tax rate on undeclared income or lowering (raising) the tax rate on declared income 
would ceteris paribus lead to less (more) tax evasion. However, ceteris paribus the magnitude of these 
effects may be rather small. In contrast, it turned out that the reduction of tax evasion by ethical 
behavior  patterns  and  lapse  of  time  effects  may  be  rather  substantial,  subject  to  the  underlying 
modeling features. Yet, if lapse of time effects are already incorporated, ethical behavior patterns seem 
to  have  much  less  influence.  Besides,  even  at  low  audit  rates,  lapse  of  time  effects  may  almost 
eliminate  tax  evasion,  if  the  spread  between  the  tax  rate  on  declared  and  undeclared  income  is 
sufficiently high. In any case, our results call for the incorporation of long lapse of time periods. To 
this extent, the increase of the lapse of time period from five to ten years in Germany in 2009 should 
contribute to a substantial reduction of German income tax evasion during the foreseeable future. 
Finally, it would be of interest to further adjust the model to real world situations. For example, the 
initial  income  distribution  could  be  adjusted  to  allow  for  distributions  with  alternative  gini 
coefficients, the initial income could be allowed to change over time to account for individual pay 
increases and decreases, and the code could be adjusted to allow agents to die and to be born, so that 
the agent population becomes heterogeneous with respect to age. However, these tasks rather delineate 
a future research agenda.  18 
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